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JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS: THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM
Substantial numbers of citizens qualified to vote under State regis-
tration and election laws are being denied . . . the right to vote,
by reason of their race or color.'
The United States Commission on Civil Rights was created by
Congress in 1957 to serve as a fact finding body and to investigate
sworn allegations of citizens being denied voting rights because of
color, race, religion, or national origin.2 The Commission Report and
testimony before recent congressional hearings3 indicate many ex-
amples of voting discrimination, primarily directed against aspiring
Negro electors. The Commission concluded that, as of 1956, 60%
of the Southern white population was registered to vote as compared
to only 25% of the Negro population. In many counties, especially
those with a majority non-white population, Negro registration was
nearly non-existent.4 While the low voting percentage among Negroes
is partially attributable to lack of education' and apathy,' much of
the result comes from obstacles constructed by whites.
The right to vote is of particular importance to minority groups
which suffer from deprivation of rights in other respects. It gives
that group a significant leverage, frequently asserted through holding
a balance of political power, with which to achieve a greater respect
for its rights through the political process.
1 Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights 41 (1959) (hereinafter
cited as Commission Report).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1957, §§ 101-06, 71 Stat. 634-36 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-75e
(1958). The Commission's life was extended from two to four years in 1959 by the act
of September 28, 1959, Pub. L. 86-383, tit. IV, § 401, 73 Stat. 724 (1959), amending 71
Stat. 635 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(b) (Supp. I, 1959).
3 "Hearings on S. 2684, S. 2719, S. 2783, S. 2814, S. 2722, S. 2785, and S. 2535,
Before the Senate Commitee on Rules and Administration," 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)
(hereinafter cited as 1960 Senate Hearings) ; "Hearings on S. 435, S. 456, S. 499, S. 810,
S. 957, S. 958, S. 959, S. 960, S. 1084, S. 1199, S. 1277, S. 1848, S. 1998, S. 2001, S. 2002,
S. 2004, and S. 2041, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on the judiciary," 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-4 (1959) (hereinafter cited
as 1959 Senate Hearings).
4 Commission Report 559-86, 587-89.
5 McGovney, The American Suffrage Medley 59-79, 88-104 (1949).
6 "Such [Negro] apathy may stem from lack of economic, educational or other
opportunities, but it does not constitute a denial of the right to vote." Commission Re-
port 52. See Lubell, The Future of American Politics, chs. 5 and 6 (2d ed. 1956).
390
COMMENT
The comment which follows attempts an analysis of the problem
thus presented and an evaluation of the remedial legislation designed
by Congress to protect voting rights. Deficiencies in this legislation
will be pointed out and a potential solution advanced for the reader's
consideration.
The right to vote is perhaps given fuller treatment in the Con-
stitution than any other interest. Among others, article I, sections 2, 3,
and 4, article II, section 1 and the twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth, seven-
teenth, nineteenth, twenty-second and twenty-third amendments all
deal with one aspect or another of the right to vote. The numerous
constitutional amendments may suggest a lingering self-consciousness
in Congress that voting rights have never been adequately treated.
At the same time, the reader may well suspect that the very number
of these amendments would militate against further changes in the near
future.
I. THE PROBLEM
For nearly a century most of the Southern states have evaded
by one means or another the clear intent of the fifteenth amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. The pattern of conscious
disfranchisement first found expression in force and intimidation.7
Left to its own devices in 1877, the South found that these means were
no longer necessary; it became possible to "buy, steal or fail to count
the Negro vote."' With the power to set the qualifications for voting,
the South had the "legal" means at hand to deprive the Negro of his
newly won right of suffrage. Various devices were adopted to circum-
vent the fifteenth amendment, including literacy, property, residence
and character qualifications, the grandfather clause, the poll tax, and
the white primary.'
A. The Present
Every device of disfranchisement which the judiciary has de-
stroyed has been replaced by a new scheme designed by the Southern
states to achieve the same ends. Extra-legal restraints are the reserve
force which remains available when legal restraints are nullified or
repealed. The prevailing means currently employed to prevent Ne-
groes from exercising their right to vote can be roughly separated into
those that amount to "discriminatory application and administration
of apparently non-discriminatory laws"'" in the registration process,
and those less subtle means involving violence and intimidation.
7 K. H. Porter, A History of Suffrage in the United States 196-97 (1918).
8 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 450 (1944).
9 McGovney, op. cit. supra note 5, at 53-56.
10 Commission Report 133.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Discriminatory application of the registration laws seems to have
been contemplated from the outset. The Chairman of the Suffrage
Subcommittee in the Virginia Convention declared: "I expect the
examination with which the black men will be confronted to be in-
spired by the same spirit that inspires every man upon this floor and
in this convention. I do not expect an impartial administration of this
clause."" The Chairman would not be disappointed by the techniques
currently used to frustrate prospective Negro registrants. Illustrative
of methods employed by state registrars to limit or prevent Negroes
from political participation are those included in the district court's
findings of fact in United States v. Raines: 2 a) The use of differently
colored registration application forms for white and Negro voters;
b) The keeping of separate registration and voting records for whites
and Negroes according to race; c) Delaying action upon applications
for registration by Negroes for periods up to two years, while not de-
laying such action with respect to applications by whites; d) In ad-
ministering literacy tests, requiring Negroes to read and write a more
lengthy and difficult paragraph of the Constitution of Georgia or of
the United States than whites are required to read and write; e) In
administering literacy tests, requiring Negroes to read aloud and to
write from dictation while not so requiring white applicants, but, in-
stead, requiring white applicants only to write by copying; f) Admin-
istering literacy tests to Negro applicants singly and apart from white
applicants while administering such tests to white applicants in groups;
and g) Requiring a higher standard of literacy of Negroes than of
white applicants in passing upon the results of the literacy test (by
examination of the Negroes pursuant to the provisions of the Georgia
Voters' Registration Act of 1958 while continuing to test the whites
under the more lenient terms of the 1949 Registration Act)."
11 Porter, op. cit. supra note 7, at 218. Compare Edmonds, the Negro and Fusion
Politics in North Carolina, 1894-1901, at 182 (1951); Official Proceedings of the Con-
stitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, 1901, pt. III, at 2828 (1941); Official
Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana, 1898, at 380 (1898).
12 189 F. Supp. 121, 132-33 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
13 Comparable methods were recounted during the 1960 Senate hearings on the
Civil Rights Act: 1) Requiring Negroes and whites to register in separate rooms and in
separate parts of the courthouse; 2) Registrars frequently reporting for work late and
leaving work early, thus reducing the number of hours available for Negro applicants;
3) Permitting only two Negro applicants in the registration room at the same time;
4) Requiring Negro applicants to read and transcribe articles from the Constitution of
the United States, in addition to filling out the voter registration questionnaire; 5) Con-
versing with applicants while they write, which practice disturbs them and stimulates
making errors; 6) Permitting a Negro to vouch for only two applicants per year; 7)
Preventing some Negroes from vouching for any applicant; 8) Failing to issue certificates
of registration to Negroes immediately upon the successful completion of the require-
ments of registration; 9) Failing to inform unsuccessful applicants of their failure to
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The Commission on Civil Rights devotes some fourteen pages of
its Report to examples of similar voting complaints.14 Enforcement
of property, literacy, and other statutory qualifications against Ne-
groes, but not against whites, is a common means of circumventing
apparently legitimate voter qualification acts." The literacy test in
particular has been described as "a fraud and nothing more" which
is administered fairly only in exceptional cases. 16 The following il-
lustrations recount some of the more flagrant abuses of the literacy
test. A North Carolina schoolteacher was asked to define certain terms
in a section of the state constitution. The teacher responded that
"This is not part of the law, to define terms"; to which the registrar
replied, "You must satisfy me, and don't argue with me." 7
In Alabama one of the questions asked a Negro applicant pursuant
to the requirement for an applicant to "understand and explain" any
clause of the Constitution was, "How many bubbles in a bar of
soap?" 8 Also in Alabama, these questions were put to Negroes re-
questing the right to vote: "What do we mean by the U.N.?" "How old
are your wife's father and mother?" "Who is in charge of street im-
provements in Birmingham?" 9 A registration official in Georgia went
so far as to claim that "God, Himself, couldn't understand" a given
constitutional provision as the official was the final judge and must be
satisfied as to the correctness of the answer.2 0
Mass purges of Negroes from the voting lists is another effective
method of disfranchisement. In Washington Parish, Louisiana, during
May, June, and July of 1959 all but roughly 200 of approximately 1500
Negro registrants were stricken from the rolls on the basis of chal-
lenges filed by members of the White Citizens' Council of that parish.
The most common basis for these challenges was alleged errors in
spelling on the application forms. White registrants whose applications
contained similar errors were not challenged. Investigation revealed
that the challengers, themselves, misspelled words when filling out the
challenging affidavits.'
fulfill the requirements for registration; 10) Failing to work on many registration days;
and 11) Resigning from the board in order not to register Negroes. 1960 Senate Hearings
194. See prayer for relief in United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd, 267 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and remanded, 362 U.S. 602, 188 F. Supp.
759 (M.D. Ala. 1960), as reproduced in 1960 Senate Hearings at 753-54.
14 Commission Report, ch. IV, "Denials of the Right to Vote," 55-68.
15 1959 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 520. Compare Commission Report 130.
10 Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation 576 (1955).
17 Myrdal, op. cit. supra, note 8 at 485.
18 Verney, "The American Negro," 1 Pol. Sci. Q. 28 (1955).
19 Key, op. cit. supra note 16, at 572, n. 22.
20 Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 8, at 485.
21 Commission Report 103-06. See United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355
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The use of violence to prevent Negroes from exercising the right
to vote appears to be diminishing. Nonetheless, force is still employed
on occasion and does serve as a very real deterrent to Negro registra-
tion and voting.22 In recent years a number of pro-segregation groups
have appeared on the Southern scene, many of them loosely federated
under the spiritual authority of the White Citizens' Council.23 Initially
these groups made no secret of the fact that their chief weapon would
be economic pressure. One of the original leaders of the White Citi-
zens' Council movement, Fred Jones, a former Mississippi State
Senator, issued the following public statement in October, 1954:
We can accomplish our purposes largely with economic pressure
in dealing with members of the Negro race who are not cooperat-
ing, and with members of the white race who fail to cooperate, we
can apply social and political pressure.2 4
Threats of injury and economic reprisal thus are commonplace. In
a series of recent cases25 the Justice Department is seeking to prevent
eviction of various Negroes and their families from the Haywood
County, Tennessee, farms where they lived and worked as share-
croppers and tenant farmers. The threatened evictions were allegedly
to prevent and punish the Negroes for their attempts to register and
to vote. Other threatening, intimidatory, and coercive devices charged
to the defendants in these cases included:
the termination of non-farm employment, refusals by merchants and
others to sell necessaries and other goods and services on credit or
even for cash in some instances, refusals to lend money to Negroes
who were economically and otherwise eligible for such loans, in-
ducing suppliers of Negro merchants not to deal with such mer-
chants, etc.26
(E.D. La. 1959), 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd, sub nor. United States v. Thomas,
362 U.S. 58 (1960).
22 The beating administered a Negro who attempted to publish a placard urging
Negroes to register and vote is related at Commission Report 96-97.
23 Fleming, "Resistance Movements and Racial Desegregation," 304 Annals 44
(1956).
24 Jackson (Miss.) Clarion Ledger, October 24, 1954.
25 United States v. Beaty, Civil No. 4065, W.D. Tenn., January 3, 1961; United
States v. Barcroft, Civil No. 4121, W.D. Tenn., January 3, 1961; United States v.
Atkeison, Civil No. 4131, W.D. Tenn., January 3, 1961. The former two cases, involving
seventy-three individuals and two banks as defendants were appealed to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals on the justice Department's request for preliminary relief against the
threatened evictions. On April 6, 1961 district court judge Marion S. Boyd was directed
by the circuit court to grant a preliminary injunction against the landowners. United
States v. Beaty, United States v. Barcroft, Civil Nos. 14433-34 (consolidated), 6th Cir.,
April 6, 1961. The New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 17, col. 1.
26 Brief for Appellant, p. 3, United States v. Beaty, United States v. Barcroft, Civil
Nos. 14433-34 (consolidated), 6th Cir., April 6, 1961.
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The Negro attempting to register often risks the loss of his job, credit,
or business.17
B. Past History
In the past several decades the various obstacles to Negro voting
in the South have been under increasingly heavy legal attack. Despite
the utterances of the Supreme Court that the fifteenth amendment
nullifies "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimina-
tion," the courts have succeeded with but limited success in effectuat-
ing the constitutional purpose.
1. The White Primary
The "white primary" had been securely established in Texas by
virtue of party rules. In 1923 the State Legislature moved to bar
Negroes from participation in Democratic Party primaries.2 8 Upon
review, the Supreme Court found it "hard to imagine a more direct
and obvious infringement" of the fourteenth amendment 9 As a
result, the legislation was repealed and the State Executive Com-
mittee authorized to establish its own membership standards.3 0 When
the same individual was again denied the right to vote in a primary,
the Supreme Court held that the Executive Committee, in excluding
Negroes from membership, had acted as a delegate of the state.3 1 Its
action was, therefore, held unconstitutional as a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws by the state. By action of the state convention of
the Democratic Party, another rule was adopted, allowing only whites
to participate in the primaries. Seemingly persuaded by the holding
of the Texas Supreme Court that political parties "are voluntary as-
sociations for political action and are not the creatures of the State,)32
the United States Supreme Court held that this action did not infringe
the fourteenth amendment, as that amendment applied only to state
action.33
These early cases afforded no discernible test for the presence
of state action necessary to constitute an abridgement of fourteenth
27 The first sworn complaint received by the Commission on Civil Rights was of
this nature. Commission Report 55. See id. at 58, 60, 64, 78; 1959 Senate Hearings, pt. 1,
at 516, 522.
28 38th Leg., Second Called Session, Gen. Laws (1923), p. 74, Vernon's Texas Stat.
art. 3093a, renumbered art. 3107 (1925).
29 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
30 40th Leg., First Called Session, Laws (1927), p. 193, Vernon's Texas Stat. art.
3107 (1927).
31 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
32 Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W.2d 113 (1934), cited in Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1935).
33 Grovey v. Townsend, supra note 32.
1961]
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or fifteenth amendment rights. The case of Smith v. Allwright34 ex-
pressly overruled Grovey v. Townsend, holding that when the privilege
of party membership "is also the essential qualification for voting in
a primary"35 the actions of the party become actions of the state, pro-
scribed by the fifteenth amendment. The eventual solution was
provided in a case involving the prosecution by federal authorities
of primary election officials in New Orleans.3 6 The Court declared
that the right to have one's vote counted where the primary was an
"integral part" of the election machinery or where in fact the primary
election "effectively controls the choice,"37 is a right protected by
article I, section 2 of the Constitution.
A final effort to resurrect the white primary was attempted by
South Carolina. All relevant state statutes were repealed 3s and the
party was left in complete control of the primary election. A sharply
worded opinion in Elmore v. Rice39 ridiculed this masquerade of the
Democratic Party as a private club.40 In the case of Brown v. Baskin,41
Negroes, though barred from party membership, were permitted to
vote in the Democratic primary if they would take an oath to support
racial segregation. This racial discrimination was held unconstitutional
on the same rationale as in the Elmore case.
The final blow to the white primary system was struck by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Terry v. Adams.42 Local candidates of the
Jaybird Party, a self-declared "club," were initially chosen in a white
primary. The successful local candidates were then chosen by the
Democratic Party as its candidates in the regular primary. The Court
held:
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is
to permit a flagrant abuse of these processes to defeat the purposes
of the Fifteenth Amendment. The use of the county-operated
primary to ratify the result of the prohibited election merely com-
pounds the offense. It violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a
state, by such circumvention, to permit within its borders the use
34 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
35 Id. at 664.
36 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
37 Id. at 318.
38 In Smith v. Allwright certain state statutes did exist that could be linked to the
primary election.
39 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. S.C.), aff'd, 162 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 875 (1948).
40 72 F. Supp. at 527: "... private clubs . . . do not vote and elect a President of
the United States, and the Senators and members of the House of Representatives ...
and under the law of our land, all citizens are entitled to a voice in such selections."
41 80 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. S.C. 1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949).
42 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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of any device that produces an equivalent of the prohibited elec-
tion.43
The white primary as a device, intended to disfranchise the Negro
citizen, is today virtually of historical importance alone."
2. The Poll Tax
There are now only five states that make the payment of a poll
tax a prerequisite to voting.45 The first appearance in the United States
of tax payment as a qualification for voting was in colonial North
Carolina. A statute of 1715 made payment of taxes a prerequisite.4 6
During some part of the twentieth century thirteen states have required
a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in all elections. Of the thirteen
only two were northern states. Designed to disfranchise the Negro,
in later years the tax operated to disfranchise poor whites as well.
Realistically, it is only with respect to those individuals for whom
the small payment is a hardship that the term disfranchisement is
applicable. Considering the high percentage of persons of low eco-
nomic levels in these states,48 we may conclude that the number thus
deterred from voting is undoubtedly considerable, although the number
cannot be ascertained with precision.
49
In Breedlove v. Suttles5 ° it was argued that a poll tax, as a
qualification for voting in state or federal elections, is unlawful. The
Court concluded that to make the payment of poll taxes a prerequisite
of voting is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Later cases involving the poll tax have re-
garded the matter as conclusively determined by this decision."
43 Id. at 469.
44 As recently as 1960, however, the Justice Department obtained a consent decree
enjoining the conduct of a white primary by the Democratic Party in Fayette County,
Tennessee. United States v. Fayette County Democratic Executive Comm., Civil No.
3835, W.D. Tenn., April 25, 1960.
45 The states and the annual rate of the tax are as follows: Alabama, $1.50;
Arkansas, $1.00; Mississippi, $2.00; Texas, $1.50; and Virginia, $1.50. The provisions of
the respective state laws governing the poll tax and its administration are set out in
Commission Report, Table I, 36-38.
46 Compare North Carolina const., 1776, art. VIII.
47 McGovney, op. cit supra note 5, at 113.
48 In 1958 the national average per capita income was $2057. In the five poll tax
states average per capita income was considerably lower: Alabama, $1359; Arkansas,
$1228; Mississippi, $1053; Texas, $1814; and Virginia, $1674. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1960, at 312 (1960).
49 Key, op. cit. supra note 16, at 599.
50 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
51 Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F.2d 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 621 (1941);
Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Va.), aff'd mem., 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
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Numerous efforts to outlaw the tax by act of Congress have been
made.5" Many of these bills have passed the House of Representatives
only to die in the Senate as a result of committee inaction or senatorial
filibuster. Thus the tax remains a potential device for racial dis-
crimination in the suffrage area. As the impact of the tax lies more in
its susceptibility to discriminatory application than in its apparent
burden, its effect as a discriminatory device is difficult to evaluate. The
record of the poll tax states in this respect is far from conclusive.
While 25% of all voting age Negroes throughout the South were
registered,53 only 3.89 % of the Negroes in Mississippi were registered,54
while in Texas the comparable figure was 38.8%.55 At present, how-
ever, it would seem that the danger posed by the poll tax rests more in
its potential, than in its actual usage as a means of discrimination.
3. The Literacy Test
Nineteen states currently impose some form of literacy require-
ment as a qualification for voting, including all but three of the
southern states.56 Alabama requires that the applicant be able to read
and write any article of the Constitution in English and to answer
questions concerning his qualifications as an elector by filling out a
questionnaire prescribed by the Alabama Supreme Court.57 Georgia
requires a demonstration by the applicant of an understanding of the
duties and obligations of citizenship in addition to the ability to read
and write English.58 A 1954 amendment to the Mississippi constitu-
tion59 sets forth the following requirements: ability to read and write
any section of the state constitution, ability to give a reasonable inter-
pretation thereof to the registrar, and the ability to demonstrate to
the registrar a reasonable understanding of the duties and obligations
of citizenship under a constitutional form of government. While the
statutory tests in these and other states vary greatly, most contain a
certain degree of ambiguity.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a literacy test, fair
62 See, e.g., S. 1734, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R. 29, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947); H.R. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); H.R. 1024 and S. 1280, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941).
53 Commission Report 559-86, 587-89.
54 Id. at 50.
55 Id. at 51. Arkansas registered 28.1%, Virginia, 21.7% and Alabama, 14.14.
Id. at 42, 48-49. Among the non-poll tax states comparable figures ranged from 14.9%
in South Carolina to 39.5% in Florida. Id. at 43, 47.
-6 Florida, Tennessee, and Texas.
67 Ala. Code tit. 17, §§ 31, 32 (Supp. 1953).
58 Ga. const. art. II, § 2-704.
59 Miss. const. art. 12, § 244.
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on its face and administered without prejudice, is valid.60 The validity
of the literacy test was indirectly challenged in the early case of Wil-
liams v. Mississippi.61 Since it did not on its face discriminate against
Negro voters and there was no showing that it had been administered
for this purpose, the test was held to be not in violation of the four-
teenth amendment. In Giles v. Harris6" the plaintiff alleged that the
literacy test and other requirements of the Alabama Constitution
6 3
were part of a conspiracy to disfranchise the Negro and, therefore,
violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Speaking for the
Court, Mr. Justice Holmes held, inter alia, that the Court lacked power
to enforce such relief and directed the plaintiff to look to the people
of his state or to the legislature and political departments of the federal
government.6 4
Where the literacy test is made inapplicable to some groups, as
by the addition of a "grandfather clause," its constitutionality will not
be upheld. In 1915 such a clause first came before the Supreme Court.
In Guinn v. United States65 a unanimous Court struck down the
Oklahoma statute as perpetuating "the very conditions which the
[fifteenth] Amendment was intended to destory."' 66 The following
year Oklahoma again sought to provide a loophole for the exemption
of illiterate whites through a more "sophisticated" registration pro-
cedure. The new law provided that persons who had voted in the
general election of 1914, held under the invalid "grandfather clause,"
were automatically registered for life. All other voters were required
to register within a specified twelve day period or be permanently dis-
franchised. Noting that the amendment "nullifies sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination,"6 the Court held this
registration scheme to be racial discrimination in violation of the
fifteenth amendment.
More recently, Alabama sought to frustrate the Smith v. All-
wright 5 decision by enactment of the "Boswell Amendment" 69 to the
state constitution. This amendment provided that no one would be
00 Emerson and Haber, 1 Political and Civil Rights in the United States 198-228
(2d ed. 1958).
61 170 U.S. 213 (1898). See Corwin, The Constitution of the United States, Analysis
and Interpretation 1185-86 (1953).
02 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
03 Ala. const. art. 8, §§ 180-88 (1901).
64 189 U.S. at 488.
65 238 U.S. 347 (1915). See Corwin, op. cit. supra note 61, at 1184.
Cc 238 U.S. at 360.
07 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
68 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
60 Ala. const. amend. No. 55 (1946).
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registered as a voter unless he had the ability to "understand and
explain" any clause of the Constitution of the United States to the
satisfaction of the board of registrars. This method of disfranchise-
ment was held violative of the fifteenth amendment because of the
grant of arbitrary powers to the election board. 0
Despite these decisions, the literacy test remains a major source
of discrimination in the realm of Negro suffrage.7' A literacy test, fair
on its face and not prone to discrimination in its administration, is
valid as a qualification which the state may impose on the prospective
voter. But the ambiguity inherent in many of these tests renders
them highly susceptible to subtle and not so subtle discrimination.
For example, a questionnaire prepared by the Alabama Supreme Court
requires the applicant to "name some of the duties and obligations of
citizenship," and asks "Do you regard those duties and obligations as
having priority over the duties and obligations you owe to any other
secular organization when they are in conflict? 7'  Despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has long been unwilling or unable to define
the term,73 a Georgia statute demands of applicants, "What is a
republican form of government?" '74
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO SAFEGUARD VOTING RIGHTS
A. Constitutional Bases
Any federal legislation affecting voting rights must find its source
in the Constitution. Article I, section 2 7 and the seventeenth amend-
ment7" stipulate that those electors who are qualified to vote for the
largest body of the state legislature shall elect the Representatives and
Senators to Congress. Despite the right of the states to establish
reasonable restrictions on the right to vote, the Supreme Court has
70 Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd ment., 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
71 The Southern Regional Council's report concludes that "[t]he legal weapon most
widely used in the South to discourage Negro registration is some form of literacy or
constitutional interpretation test." Price, The Negro Voter in the South 7 (1957).
72 See "Hearings on H.R. 140 et al., Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Com-
mittee on the judiciary," 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 906-08 (1957); Note, 4 Ala. L. Rev. 317
(1952).
73 See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
74 Ga. Code Ann. § 34-118 (Supp. 1958).
75 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 provides: The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen every Second Year by The People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
76 U.S. Const. amend. XVII provides for election of Senators by the people qualified
to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the state legislature, modifying
article I, § 3.
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held that the right of the people to vote for these offices stems from the
federal constitution.
77
Another fundamental source of federal power, article I, section
4 provides:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of Chusing
Senators.78
Although doubts may be expressed as to the extent of power thus
granted,79 the Supreme Court has suggested that Congress has the
power
to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as
to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, super-
vision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and cor-
rupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers,
and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact
the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved.8
0
Congress may prohibit state and private acts of interference in presi-
dential as well as in congressional elections. 8' This power includes
control over all phases of the political process leading to these elec-
tions.8 2
The fourteenth, fifteenth and nineteenth amendments impose limi-
tations on both the United States and the individual states in the
execution of voting laws." The nineteenth amendment proscribes the
denial or abridgement of voting rights because of sex. The fourteenth
amendment, in part, prohibits the states from abridging the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States8 4 or denying to any
77 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (Senator) ; United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941) (Representative); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383
(1915) (Representative); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62-64 (1900) (Representative);
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1884) (Representative).
78 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4.
79 Compare 106 Cong. Rec. 3550 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1960) (remarks of Senator
Robertson) and 1960 Senate Hearings, 139-40 (statement of Senator Stennis), with id.
at 57 (statement of Senator javits).
80 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
81 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
651 (1884).
82 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), allowed control over the primary
election.
83 McGovney, op. cit. supra note 5, at 4.
84 Dictum in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908), suggests that these
privileges and immunities include the right to vote for national officers.
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person the equal protection of the law. 5 The fifteenth amendment
expressly prohibits both the United States and the states from denying
a citizen the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
have always been interpreted as applicable only to the prevention of
discriminatory "state action" and not to discriminatory conduct by
individuals acting free of state authority.86
Congress is vested with the power to enforce the provisions of
these amendments by "appropriate legislation." The scope of the
foregoing term for purpose of the amendments is fairly broad. Any
means not specifically prohibited by the Constitution appears to satisfy
the standard. 7 So long as the means chosen are not prohibited by the
Constitution and bear a legitimate relationship with the ends in view,
the legislation will be "appropriate. 88
B. Reconstruction Legislation
On April 9, 1866, Congress passed over President Johnson's veto
the first of five civil rights statutes that were to stand as the bulwark
of the Reconstruction legislation." The initial act provided that all
citizens, without regard to color, were entitled to the same rights to
contract, sue, give evidence, take, hold and convey property, and to
the equal benefit of all laws for the security of persons and property."
Subsequent to passage of the fourteenth9' and fifteenth92 amendments,
the Congress reenacted the act of 1866 and endeavored to protect the
right of free suffrage without discrimination as to race, color or previous
85 This clause afforded the basis of relief in two early "white primary" cases con-
sidered previously. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 271 U.S.
536 (1927).
86 E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
87 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880). The Civil Rights Act of 1957 has
recently been declared "appropriate legislation" to enforce the fifteenth amendment. In
re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959); United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp.
355 (E.D. La. 1959), 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd, sub nor. United States v.
Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
88 In cases holding the Civil Rights Act of 1870 unconstitutional, however, the
Supreme Court objected to the "ends," i.e., the purposes of the statute, rather than the
"means" employed to reach those "ends." James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
162 (1875); Compare United States v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959)
(holding 71 Stat. 637 [1957], 42 U.S.C. § 1971[c] [19581 invalid on similar grounds),
rev'd, 362 U.S. 17, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
89 The full text of these civil rights laws appears in Carr, Federal Protection of
Civil Rights: Quest for a Sword, App. I (1947).
90 Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
91 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, adopted June 16, 1866, and ratified July 21, 1868.
92 U.S. Const. amend. XV, adopted February 26, 1869, and ratified March 30, 1870.
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condition of servitude. 3 The following year supplemental legislation
was enacted which gave further effect to the voting provisions of the
earlier act by providing for the regulation of elections by "voting
supervisors" to be appointed thereunder."4 In April of 1871 penalties
were established for depriving any person of the equal protection of
the laws, or the privileges and immunities of the law by conspiracy or
under color of law.9 An act which required all inns, public convey-
ances, and other places of public amusement to accomodate all persons,
subject only to such conditions as were applicable to citizens of every
race and color,96 constituted the last congressional legislation in the
civil rights area for a period of 82 years.
Intended to secure a status of equality to the Negro, these early
acts were largely deemed a failure. 7 Their lack of success is in some
measure attributable to judicial invalidation and congressional inaction,
both of which conspired to nullify their desired effect. Even so, these
acts remain as the wellspring of certain of the currently available
remedies in the suffrage area.
C. Current Remedies
Several sections of the Reconstruction legislation have survived to
afford current protection of civil rights generally and voting rights in
particular. In addition to those sections which proclaim rights but
carry no remedial sanctions, 98 this legislation is readily divided be-
tween that which creates remedies in the form of civil causes of action
and that which imposes criminal sanctions. This legislation has now
been supplemented by the Civil Rights Acts of 195791 and 1960.101
03 Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140.
94 Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433.
95 Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
906 Act of March 1, 1875, 18 Stat. 335.
97 Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights: To Secure These Rights
(1947).
98 Rev. Stat. § 2004 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1958) ; Rev. Stat. § 1977 (1875),
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1958); Rev. Stat. § 1978 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1958). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(a) is derived from the Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140; § 1981
from the Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144; § 1982 from the Act of
April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. These three sections merely declare the existence of
equality without distinction as to race, color, or previous condition of servitude in such
matters as voting, owning property, ability to sue, give evidence, contract, etc.
09 71 Stat. 634-38 (1957), 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 (1958), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861 (1958),
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 1995 (1958).
100 P. L. 86-449, approved May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), 18 U.S.CA. §§ 837,
1074, 1509 (Supp. 1960), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 640 (Supp. 1960), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971,
1974, 1975 (Supp. 1960).
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1. Civil Suits
Private civil actions under section 1983101 of the Civil Rights Act
may be instituted against persons who act "under color of any statute"
to deprive another of any rights, privileges or immunities protected or
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Persons
guilty of such action shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law or in a suit in equity.102 Protected here is the right of all quali-
fied persons to vote in federal elections as well as the right not to be
the subject of state-imposed racial discrimination in any election. Suits
against registration officials for discrimination based on race are
countenanced, and, to this extent at least, the section is constitu-
tional." 3 Recent application of this section by the Supreme Court
invests the act with greater vitality than the lower courts have ac-
corded it in recent years. 0 4
Section 1985105 affords similar causes of action for conspiracy to
interfere with or deprive a person of his federal rights. However, this
section was rendered practically useless by the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Collins v. Hardyman.10 6
Section 1986107 allows a similar civil recovery against those who,
having the power to prevent the commission of such acts, refuse or
neglect to do so.
2. Criminal Sanctions
The two relevant criminal statutes are 18 U.S.C., sections 241108
101 Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958) (derived from the Act of
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13).
102 "Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
103 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915);
Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D. S.C.), aff'd, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
104 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Chicago police officers were held liable
to the aggrieved party under § 1983 for acts constituting an unreasonable search and
seizure.
105 Rev. Stat. § 1980 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1958) (derived from the Act
of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13).
106 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
107 Rev. Stat. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1958) (derived from the Act of
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 15).
108 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958): If two or more persons conspire
to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment
of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
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and 242.19 Section 241 is directed against individuals without regard
to their possible official capacity. It is immaterial that the defendant in
a section 241 suit may be a state official; the fact that he is would not
enlarge the rights of the complainant protected by the section.110
The scope of protection afforded by this section includes only
those rights "secured by the Constitution and federal laws." This
clearly encompasses those rights created directly by the Constitution
or by Congress in the exercise of its substantive powers."' It is still
doubtful, however, whether the federally protected rights guaranteed
against state actions by the fourteenth amendment's due process and
equal protection clauses are incorporated into this section, even though
the individuals involved had been acting under color of state laws.
This issue confronted the Supreme Court in United States v. Wil-
Hams."2 The Court divided evenly, four to four, on the question.
Consequently, it would appear that the section is applicable only to
state election officials who obstruct the registration of qualified Negroes
to vote in federal elections. This result follows because the right to
vote in a federal election arises from the citizen's relationship with the
federal government, while the right to be free from discrimination in
any election is a right merely protected from state interference by the
fifteenth amendment."
3
Section 242, like 42 U.S.C., section 1983, concerns action under
color of law where either federally secured or protected rights are in-
volved. The effectiveness of the protection under section 242 is limited
by the requirement that the action be willful." 4
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
109 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958): Whoever, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State,
Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punish-
ments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an allen, or by reason
of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined
not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
110 United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
1' E.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (right to vote in and to
have one's vote counted in a federal election).
112 341 U.S. 70 (1951). The defendants, acting under color of law, had obtained
confessions by the use of force and were indicted under § 241 for having interfered with
a right arising under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
113 See Note, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 133, 145-46 (1958).
114 It was by a strict interpretation of the requirement of willful action that the
Supreme Court warded off an attack on § 242 because of vagueness in Screws v. United
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
It would seem clear that the rights given under the due process,
equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses of the four-
teenth amendment,'15 as well as those rights given by national citizen-
ship and federal laws,:"6 can be protected under this section, as under
its civil counterpart, section 1983. Section 242 thus proscribes dis-
criminatory application of voting criteria by state election officials in
both state and federal elections.
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1957
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 consists, in essence, of four main
provisions: 1) the creation of a Civil Rights Commission," 7 2) the
addition of an Assistant Attorney General," 8 3) further protection of
voting rights,"-' and 4) the establishment of a limited right to trial by
jury in cases of criminal contempt arising out of conduct prohibited by
the act.20
Section 1971 provides that all citizens otherwise qualified to vote
"shall be entitled and allowed to vote" in any election without regard
to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 1' 2  This declara-
tion of right is implemented by subsection (c) of section 1971 which
permits the Attorney General to institute a suit for preventive relief
whenever any person has engaged or is about to engage in any act or
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). But see Clark v. United States, 193 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1951) ;
Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951) ; and -Crews v. United States, 160
F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947). In the recent case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 207
(1961), Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarks that "even in the criminal area, the specific
intent demanded by Screws has proved to be an abstraction serving the purposes of a
constitutional need without impressing any actual restrictions upon the nature of the
crime which the jury tries."
115 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939);
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876), establish the proposition that "rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution" include the rights of qualified persons to vote in any election free from
discrimination imposed under color of state law.
116 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), makes it clear that the right of
qualified voters to cast their ballots for federal officials is secured by the Constitution,
and that a willful denial of this right by state election officials is punishable under
the section.
117 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975c (1958).
118 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 5 U.S.C. § 295-1 (1958).
119 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(b)-(e) (1958).
120 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1958).
121 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1958), amending Rev. Stat. § 2004
(1875). Section 1971 as originally enacted was designed to implement the fifteenth
amendment. Cast in the form of a mere declaration of right, the original section carried




practice which could be contrary to any person's right under the
initial subsection. 22
The initiation of injunctive suits by the Attorney General requires
neither the consent of the individual whose rights are to be vindi-
cated123 nor the exhaustion of whatever judicial or administrative reme-
dies a state may require.124 Although prior statutes did not expressly
require the exhaustion of state judicial remedies in suffrage cases,125
federal courts usually refused to review decisions of state administra-
tive officials without a showing to that effect. 2 Temporary relief may
now be granted before election day has passed. Adjudication of the
constitutionality of state statutes under which the right to vote is
denied may be obtained more promptly.
27
Persons disobeying such injunctions are subject to contempt pro-
ceedings without a jury. However, the defendant may demand a trial
de novo in a criminal contempt proceeding when the judge imposes a
fine in excess of $300 or imprisonment of longer than forty-five days.
Contempt committed in the presence of the court or by an officer of the
court may be punished without affording the defendant a jury trial. 2
The constitutionality of section 1971 was brought under attack in
United States v. Raines'"9 and in United States v. McElveen.' ° Al-
though the former case was brought against state election officials, it
was argued that the section could also be employed to punish private
individuals for interfering with the rights of prospective Negro voters
in state and local elections. Reasoning that Congress had only the
power to regulate federal elections and to prohibit state action that
denied individuals the right to vote on discriminatory grounds, the dis-
trict court dismissed the action on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. The district court in the latter case upheld the con-
122 See generally, Comment, 43 Cornell L. Q. 661 (1958); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
573 (1958).
123 H.R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1957); H.R. Rep. No. 2187, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 78 (1956).
124 71 Stat. 637 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(d) (1958).
125 Originally it had been held, in at least one case, that the plaintiffs must exhaust
all state administrative and judicial remedies. Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 F.2d 563 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659 (1933). Later the courts generally accepted the posi-
tion that it was not necessary to exhaust state judicial remedies. Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268 (1939).
126 E.g., Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
127 H.R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1957).
128 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1958).
129 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D.
Ga. 1960).
130 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La. 1959), 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, sub
nora. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 531 (1960).
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stitutionality of the section as applied to the actions of state officials
and others acting under color of state law.
Relying on the familiar rule that precludes consideration of con-
stitutional issues not necessary under the facts presented by the case,
the Supreme Court affirmed McElveen'31 and reversed the Raines
decision. 32 These decisions thus affirm the constitutionality of section
1971 as applied to discriminatory treatment by registration officials.
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1960
Title VI of the 1960 act 33 provides that the Attorney General
shall first bring a civil suit under section 1971 of the 1957 Civil Rights
Act to protect the Negroes' right to vote. If such suit is successful,
he can then ask the court to hold another adversary proceeding and
make a separate finding that there was a "pattern or practice" of
depriving Negroes in the area involved in the suit of their right to
vote. When a court finds such a "pattern or practice," any Negro
living in the area may apply to the court to issue an order declaring
him qualified to vote if he is able to prove: 1) that he was qualified
to vote under state law; 2) that he had tried to register after the
"pattern or practice" finding; and 3) that he had not been allowed
to register or had been found unqualified by someone acting under
color of state law. 34 The court must hear the Negro's application
within ten days. Notification of the order, which is effective for a
period as long as that for which the applicant would have been
qualified to vote if registered under state law, is communicated to
the appropriate state officials. Failure to comply subjects the official
in question to contempt proceedings.
To effectuate the act, the court may appoint one or more voting
referees, 3 13 who must themselves be qualified voters in the judicial
131 Sub nom. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
132 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
133 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(e) (Supp. 1960).
134 In United States v. Ass'n of Citizen's Councils, Civil No. 7881, W.D. La., the
justice Department is seeking a determination by the district court that a pattern or
practice of discrimination in voting registration exists. Appointment of a referee is being
sought. Although the case was tried in November, 1960, no decision has been rendered
as of this writing. For an earlier opinion in the case, see 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La.
1960). The justice Department has also taken steps, without public announcement,
toward naming of a referee in Terrell County, Georgia, but has thus far been unsuccessful.
United States v. Raines, Civil No. 442, M.D. Ga., January 24, 1961. See The New York
Times, June 8, 1960, p. 1, col. 8.
135 The referees would have the powers conferred on court masters by Rule 53(c)




district. Proceedings before the referees are intended to be simple.
The referee must take the Negro's application and proof in an ex
parte proceeding. The referee must then report to the district court
stating whether or not the applicant is qualified to vote and whether
or not he has been denied the right to vote by state officials. Upon
a finding favorable to the applicant, the district court will then order
the Attorney General to transmit a show-cause order returnable within
ten days to state election officials who may challenge the referee's
report.
Either the court or the referee may decide the challenges in
accordance with court-directed procedures. Challenges on points of
law must be accompanied by a legal memorandum; challenges on
points of fact must be accompanied by a verified copy of a public
record or an affidavit by those with personal knowledge of the con-
troverting evidence. The referee's report is determinative in issues
of the applicant's literacy. If the court determines that the applicant
is qualified, it issues to him a certificate stating his eligibility. Pro-
visional orders may be issued to enable an applicant to vote pending
determination of his application.
136
In any suit instituted under these provisions, the state would be
held responsible for the actions of its officials and, in the event state
officials resign and are not replaced, the state itself could be sued.' 37
The 1960 act appears to be a clearly constitutional exercise of
congressional power to regulate federal elections. 38 Since eligible
candidates are qualified to vote only after the district court has deter-
mined that they have been discriminatorily denied the right to register
or to vote by state action, the act seems to constitute "appropriate
legislation" for the implementation of the fifteenth amendment, in-
sofar as state and local elections are affected.
139
136 If a Negro has applied for a court certificate twenty or more days prior to
the election and such application has not been determined by election day, the court
must allow him to vote provisionally, and impound his ballot pending a decision on his
application. If he applies within twenty days of the election, the court has the option
of whether or not to let him vote.
137 Section 601(b), 74 Stat. 86 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c) (Supp. 1960). How
this section is to be enforced is not altogether dear. Moreover, in United States v.
Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960), the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal by the district
court (267 F.2d 805) and remanded for further proceedings. In so doing the Court did
not express any view upon the constitutionality of this section, thus leaving the issue
open for subsequent determination. 362 U.S. at 604.
238 See text supra at notes 75-82.
139 Ibid.
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III. CONTINUED OBSTACLES TO NEGRO VOTING
A. Limited Coverage of Existing Legislation
The catalogue of civil and criminal remedies related above would
afford less than complete protection of suffrage rights even if they
were not further impeded by practical difficulties.
The civil sanctions, which seek to protect voting rights from
infringement, are limited in their application to instances involving
conspiracies or state action.140 The criminal penalties that can be
assessed against persons who intimidate others in the exercise of their
voting rights purport to apply to any election.141 Primary elections
or conventions of a political party, however, are excluded by deft-
nition.14 Thus only when section 1971, which does include primaries,
is combined with the criminal sanctions imposed by sections 241 and
242 can prosecuting authorities reach proscribed election activities
which occur in a primary election. As suggested earlier, these sec-
tions are limited to the political machinery attendant upon federal
elections or to action under color of state law.' 43 The Civil Rights
Acts of 1957 and 1960 are similarly limited; on their face, they
appear to extend only to interference by state action and not to acts
of private discrimination. By judicial construction, their scope seems
destined to remain thus limited.144
B. Reluctance to Prosecute
The process of judicial enforcement of suffrage rights involves
a number of inherent defects. The method of litigation as a remedy
for discrimination in the voting rights field is considerably less than
a panacea. Initially, many Negroes will be deterred from invoking
these remedies by the fear of economic or physical retaliation.14 5
Although the 1957 act does not require the consent of the individual
whose rights are to be vindicated as a prerequisite to the initiation
of injunctive suits by the Attorney General, 146 the Justice Department
is naturally reluctant to begin proceedings without a willing com-
140 Rev. Stat. §§ 1979-81 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-86 (1958).
141 62 Stat. 720 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 594 (1958).
142 62 Stat. 719 (1948) as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1958), sets forth definitions
governing that part of the criminal code dealing with elections.
343 See text supra at notes 101-16.
144 United States v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17,
189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960); United States v. McElveen, 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.
La. 1959), 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd, sub non. United States v. Thomas, 362
U.S. 58 (1960).
145 See 103 Cong. Rec. 9800 (daily ed. July 8, 1957).
146 H.R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1957). Objections to this "novel"
idea are voiced in H.R. Rep. No. 2187, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1956).
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plainant 47 The Justice Department also entertains a fear of harden-
ing resistance if litigation is pushed in areas where feeling is strong
against the federal government.'48 The 1960 act requires the indi-
vidual complainant to claim discriminatory treatment at the hands
of election officials and to request that the United States bring suit
under section 1971(c). 119 Thus Negroes, to invoke the remedy of
the act, must bring publicized charges against local public officials,
thereby identifying the complainant as a target for coercion and
intimidation."' Other Negroes who would avail themselves of a
determination that a pattern of discrimination existed, must identify
themselves to registration officials, and then to a referee and a district
court. As the act contemplates an open hearing at some point, the
complainants' names cannot remain secret.
The ultimate disposition of the Haywood County cases may well
provide the most significant development yet achieved under the 1957
act. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a preliminary in-
junction against nearly seventy defendants based on evidence of
threats, intimidation, and coercion. 5' Violation of the restraining
order would subject the offenders to punishment for contempt of
court. Such a sanction may go far in alleviating, if not eliminating,
some of the practical difficulties inherent in the judicial enforcement
of suffrage rights.
The civil remedies present an additional difficulty. It is doubtful
that many individual Negroes can find the necessary resources re-
quired to support such litigation. Even those individuals with suf-
ficient financial resources are unlikely to institute lengthy and costly
litigation merely to secure their franchise. The lower federal courts
have thus far been unwilling to permit class suits as a solution to
this dilemma.5 2
147 However, Clarence Mitchell, an NAACP director, testified that the government's
failure to act was due not to an absence of complaints, but rather to an administrative
decision not to bring suit unless victory was certain. 1959 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at
295-96.
148 1959 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 223 (testimony of Attorney General Rogers).
149 74 Stat. 90 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c) (Supp. 1960).
150 In addition to the Haywood County cases, supra note 25, see United States
v. Deal, Civil No. 8132, WI). La., in which eleven individuals and eleven corporations
were charged with a violation of § 1971(b) by refusing to gin cotton for a Negro farmer
after he had testified at the New Orleans hearing of the Commission on Civil Rights
regarding his unsuccessful efforts to register and vote. The case has been continued in-
definitely by stipulation of the parties.
151 The New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 17, col. 1. Supra note 25.
152 Compare Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1958), with Sharp v. Lucky,
252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958).
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C. Difficulty of Locating Defendants
Once the initial reluctance to institute proceedings is overcome,
there yet remains the difficulty of locating the appropriate defendant.
In the case of United States v. McElveen,153 Judge Wright notes that
the registrar is an indispensable party to the granting of relief under
section 1971(c). 154 Much publicity attends the efforts by the Civil
Rights Commission or the FBI to secure evidence of voting rights
discrimination.'55 Registrars are consequently forewarned that a suit
is to be instituted and may resign their office, thereby avoiding the
litigation.
In United States v. Alabama 56 registrars Livingston and Rogers
submitted their resignations during a controversy with the Civil
Rights Commission. 5' Two months later the Justice Department
filed suit to force the registration of qualified Negroes in Macon
County. The district court held" 8 that the 1957 act did not authorize
suits against impersonal entities such as the Board of Registrars or
the State of Alabama and therefore dismissed the action. The court
of appeals affirmed this disposition.1 59
Confronted with this judicial construction of the 1957 act, the
administration proposed,6 0 and Congress adopted, a provision in the
1960 act authorizing suit against a state as a party defendant when
the state registrars resign.16' United States v. Alabama ' 2 was heard
153 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La. 1959), 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd, sub nor.
United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
154 177 F. Supp. at 357, citing Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947).
155 Referring to the Montgomery, Alabama hearing by the Commission on
December 8, 1958, the Commission Report notes that "two dozen newsmen sat at the
press tables, and four television cameras whirred quietly in the rear." Commission
Report 75.
156 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.) aff'd, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and
remanded, 362 U.S. 602, 188 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
157 Commission Report 69-97.
158 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and
remanded, 362 U.S. 602, 188 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
159 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and remanded, 362 U.S. 602, 188 F. Supp.
759 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
160 The administration submitted an original and revised version of its proposal.
The original proposal is contained in a number of bills introduced in both Houses of
Congress. H.R. 10018, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 28, 1960, Congressman Goodell);
H.R. 10034, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 28, 1960, Congressman Lindsay); H.R. 10035,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 28, 1960, Congressman McCulloch); S. 3001, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Feb. 8, 1960, Senator Dirksen).
161 Section 601(b), 74 Stat. 86 (1960), 42 U.S.C.. § 1971(c) (Supp. 1960): When-
ever, in a proceeding instituted under this subsection any official of a State or subdivision
thereof is alleged to have committed any act or practice constituting a deprivation of
any right or privilege secured by subsection (a), the act or practice shall also be deemed
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by the Supreme Court on May 2, 1960. On May 6, 1960, the Pres-
ident signed the Civil Rights Act of 1960. The Court vacated the
judgment of the lower court and remanded on the ground that the
case must be decided "on the basis of the law now controlling." In
so doing, the Court did not reach the merits of the controversy,
constitutional or otherwise.
The 1960 act does not preclude the necessary delay involved in
the case where new registrars are finally appointed. In such a situa-
tion it would seem that the Department of Justice must wait until
new evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination by the new
registrars can be developed. Just as the practice of resigning from
the registration board in order not to register Negroes seems to be
an accepted practice,'163 similar resignation for the purpose of frus-
trating judicial action seems most likely.'64
D. Lack of Evidence
It has often been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the neces-
sary evidence to present to a jury. The possibility of censure or
retaliation by the white community may thwart the efforts of some
Negroes to obtain testimony. Nevertheless, testimony of Negroes as
to their treatment by white election officials can be obtained by the
Justice Department in most cases. 165 Somehow, evidence must be
presented to show that the registration officials, in administering the
registration standards, exercised their broad discretion in bad faith,
i.e., discriminatorily. Such evidence of bad faith is difficult to prove. 166
Each of the sanctions previously considered is premised on the
fact of discrimination because of race or color-the fact of a dif-
ference in treatment accorded to Negroes from that accorded white
persons. The evidence to establish such comparisons is extremely
scarce for several reasons. Although recent cases tend to emphasize
the importance of the registrar's records as a basis for comparison, 167
that of the State and the State may be joined as a party defendant and, if prior to the
institution of such proceeding, such official has resigned or has been relieved of his
office and no successor has assumed such office, the proceeding may be instituted against
the State.
162 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
163 Sellers v. Wilson, 123 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Ala. 1964); "Equality Before the
Law: A Symposium on Civil Rights," 54 Nw. U. L. Rev. 330, 369-70 (1959).
164 1960 Senate Hearings 194.
165 Commission Report 129-30.
166 Putzel, "Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal," 99 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 439, 451 (1951).
167 "Analysis of a random sampling of 200 cards, 198 of which were of white
persons, revealed that over 60%7 had such defects and inconsistencies [as did the chal-
lenged Negro registrants], and the defendant Registrar, who has worked with all
414 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
many Southern registrars keep no records of rejected applicants. 6
This requires thoughtful action by Negro complainants to obtain
witnessed instances in which state officials acted improperly. Ala-
bama's hastily enacted legislation, intended to authorize registrars to
dispose of their records after thirty days,'69 has been partially circum-
vented by title III of the 1960 act. 70 The 1960 act, however, is
devoid of any provision that would require registrars to make records
in the first instance.
Of the records available, many do not, on their face, disclose
evidence of discriminatory application of such evasive standards as
the literacy test. Moreover, Southern officials can often occasion
critical delay in the delivery of these records once they are requested.
The conduct of George C. Wallace, Judge of the Third Circuit Court
of Alabama, is illustrative of this point.' 71 On October 21, 1958, two
investigators for the Civil Rights Commission sought to inspect cer-
tain voting and registration records. Judge Wallace impounded the
voter registration records of Barbour and Bullock counties. When
served with a commission subpoena, Judge Wallace told the press:
"They are not going to get the records. And if any agent of the
registration cards since 1949, testified that at least 50% had such errors and omissions."
United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10, 13 (E.D. La.), aff'd, sub nom. United States
v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
168 1959 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, at 191 (testimony of Attorney General Rogers).
169 Ala. Code tit. 17, § 31 (Supp. 1959) (approved February 24, 1959).
170 74 Stat. 88 (1960), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1974 (Supp. 1960). Pursuant to this section,
demands have been made for election records in seventeen counties or parishes in six
states on the basis of information suggesting racial discrimination. In In re Palmer, No.
10 Sundry, E.D. La., July 18, 1960, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 774-75 (1960), Judge J. Skelly
Wright ordered compliance with the Justice Department's request to inspect records in
East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana. Defendant's appeal has been abandoned. Civil No.
18476, 5th Cir. Similarly, in In re Lucky and In re Manning, Civil Nos. 7971-72 (con-
solidated), W.D. La., December 6, 1960, the court ordered compliance with the Depart-
ment's demand to inspect records in Ouachita and East Carroll Parishes. In In re
Dinkens, 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), Judge Johnson granted the application
to enforce a records demand in Montgomery County. On appeal the decision was
affirmed, per curiam. 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1961). In In re Bruce, Civil No. 2390, S.D.
Ala., and In re Lewis, Civil No. D-C-1-61, N.D. Miss., applications to enforce the
government's demands under title I1I in Wilcox County, Alabama, and Bolivar County,
Mississippi, are pending. In In re Gallion, Civil No. 1011, N.D. Ala., January 23, 1961,
and United States v. Hildreth, Civil No. 1012, N.D. Ala., January 23, 1961, an applica-
tion for enforcement of the government's demand to inspect records in Sumter County,
Alabama, and a motion for injunction were filed. The court ruled in favor of the gov-
ernment.
For an opinion involving the Department's motion to preserve records under Rule
34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures see United States v. Ass'n of Citizens'
Councils, 187 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1960).
171 Commission Report 70-71.
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Civil Rights Commission comes down here to get them, they will be
locked up."172 The federal district court ordered Wallace to produce
the records.'7 3 Wallace responded with an elaborate game of hide
and seek, delaying obedience to the court order by turning the records
over to grand juries. In all, several months elapsed before the records
were finally produced and examined.
Direct testimony by white persons is extremely difficult to obtain
in cases of this nature. Testimony can usually be obtained only
through judicially applied coercion; even then the witness is most
likely to be a hostile one, giving evasive answers to the questions
propounded. Although the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Depart-
ment may request the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct
investigations into matters involving complaints of discrimination,'
174
there is a feeling in some circles that this assistance is less than help-
ful. The FBI, charged with responsibilities in many other areas,'
175
may well be reluctant to compromise its effectiveness in those areas
with a spirited investigation into charges of discriminatory prac-
tices. 76
The difficulties presented in obtaining evidence of discriminatory
treatment have considerably prolonged the course of litigation. Dur-
ing such postponement, the Justice Department may find its evidence
evaporating due to coercion applied to potential witnesses by em-
ployers, "citizens" councils, creditors, trades-people, and the local
press.177
E. The Presumption of Innocence
The Department of Justice over the years has encountered seri-
ous difficulties in securing convictions for civil rights violations.
7 1
Such prosecutive difficulties are compounded in cases of non-violent
172 Id. at 71, citing The Associated Press, night report from Montgomery, Dec. 5,
1958.
173 In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
174 Commission Report 129-30.
175 Hoover, "Cooperation: The Key to Effective Law Enforcement in America," 12
Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (1960).
176 ,.. . there are also indications that upon occasion investigations in this very
difficult and highly specialized area have not measured up to the Bureau's high standards
in the handling of other types of cases." Emerson and Haber, op. cit. supra note 60, at
119.
177 In one case in a deep southern state, a middle-class Negro who had courageously
attempted to vote and to complain to the Department of Justice when he was refused
access to the polls, subsequently became so afraid of reprisal that he indicated uncertainty
whether he would be willing to testify in court. He asked if he should decide to testify
to be given ample notice of the date so that he could first move his family out of the
region. Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, supra note 97, at 40.
178 Putzel, supra note 166, at 449; Note, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 76, 96 (1947).
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racial discrimination, common to the voting field." 9 The defendant
in a civil rights case is quite often ail influential citizen of his com-
munity, while his victim is normally the opposite.
Criminal prosecutions under sections 241 and 242 both require
a verdict of guilty by a jury often sympathetic with the defendant.'
Moreover, section 241 requires proof of a conspiracy. A single regis-
trar, acting independently, will not be liable for discriminatory acts
under this section. In a section 242 prosecution, the government must
show that the defendant acted "wilfully," intending to deprive the
complainant of federal constitutional rights. Emphasis on willful
violations of constitutional rights in the majority opinion in Screws v.
United States'8 ' has had unfortunate effects. 82 This requirement
makes it easy for a judge unsympathetic to the prosecution to induce
a jury to acquit, as actually happened in the retrial of the Screws
case.1 8 3
When section 1983 is employed to secure a money judgment,
comparable difficulties are encountered, although the plaintiff is not
required to show wilfulness, nor to convince the jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Suits for equitable relief under this section and under
the acts of 1957 and 1960 avoid the barrier presented by juries sym-
pathetic with the defendant. Under section 1971 election officials
charged with discriminatory treatment of Negroes are tried before a
federal judge who is presumably less apt to act on the basis of preju-
dice. It should be noted, however, that federal judges in the South
are under heavy fire from local groups in sit-in and school desegrega-
tion cases. The extent to which these individuals can or should be
further subjected to such abuse is highly questionable.
The jury trial aspect of the contempt proceedings under the 1957
act tends to weaken the effectiveness of this remedy as illustrated
by the Wallace case previously considered. In that case the Justice
Department was informally advised by Judge Johnson, the presiding
federal judge, that
he was unwilling to hold local Judge Wallace for contempt if
forty-five days was the maximum penalty he could impose, since
it was his feeling that this would enhance Judge Wallace's politi-
cal position in Alabama without visiting any effective punishment
upon him.' 84
179 Commission Report 130.
180 Emerson and Haber, op. cit. supra note 60, at 120.
181 325 U.S. 91 (1945). See Cohen, "The Screws Case: Federal Protection of Negro
Rights," 46 Colum. L. Rev. 94 (1946) ; Note, 55 Yale L.J. 576 (1946) ; Note, 44 Mich. L.
Rev. 814 (1946); supra note 114.
182 Putzel, supra note 166, at 450.
183 See Carr, op. cit. supra note 89, at 114.
184 106 Cong. Rec. 5684 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1960).
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Although the opinion makes it clear that Wallace failed to respond
to the federal court order allowing inspection of registration and vot-
ing records, Judge Johnson "found" that Wallace was not in contempt
of court.8 5
F. Delay in the Courts
Where law enforcement rests in the hands of judicial officers
appointed from communities hostile to the law in question, there is
a very real risk that the courts will be employed as an instrument
of delay. Thus, in United States v. Raines,"6 the district court
ignored the established policy of determining only the constitution-
ality of acts as they applied to the case at bar"8 7 and dismissed the
complaint, holding the Civil Rights Act of 1957 invalid because it
presumably authorized the Attorney General to seek an injunction
against a private citizen for an individual act, divorced completely
from state action. But the suit was brought to restrain Georgia elec-
tion officials from depriving Negroes of the right to register and vote
because of their race or color. On direct appeal by the government,
the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court. 88 In
September, 1960, two years after the complaint had been filed and
seventeen months after the lower court first acted, the government
finally obtained a judgment on the merits, directing the Terrell
County election officials to permit certain Negroes to vote and to
refrain from discriminatory application of literacy tests.8 9
Similar delays have resulted from the very nature of the adver-
sary proceeding. For example, defense counsel in United States v.
Alabama"' filed a motion to dismiss on fifty-four separate grounds.
Fourteen months later, after the Supreme Court had disposed of these
contentions' 9 ' and remanded the case, the Justice Department filed
an amended complaint. 92 Again the defendants moved to dismiss,
this time assigning over one hundred grounds for the motion. 9
185 In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. Ala. 1959).
186 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D.
Ga. 1960).
187 "The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not
to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined." 362 U.S. 17, 22
(1960).
188 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
189 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
190 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and
remanded, 362 U.S. 602, 188 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
'9' 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
192 The amended complaint alleged a "slow down" in processing Negroes for
registration and discriminatory application of literacy tests to Negroes and general state
failure to make it possible for many qualified Negroes to vote.
193 188 F. Supp. 759, 760 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
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Although few of these grounds merited serious consideration by the
court,'94 the Justice Department could ill afford to ignore any of
them. Each must be researched, again at the cost of time. In the
case of United States v. Alabama well over two years have elapsed
since the initial complaint was filed and still no decision on the merits
has been reached. Motions to dismiss have also served to prolong
the litigation in United States v. Raines 5 and United States v.
McElveen.'96
G. Limited Effect of Judgment
Even if the foregoing obstacles can be surmounted, success in
each of these suits would qualify only a limited number of Negroes.
After two years of litigation, only four persons were registered as a
result of United States v. Raines197 Successful prosecution under the
1957 and 1960 acts guarantees only that the few Negroes actually
named in the complaint will be registered. At most, the only Negroes
who would be qualified by such a decree would be those within the
voting subdivision administered by the defendant election officials.
It is unrealistic to expect registrars in Bullock County, Alabama,
to desist from discriminating merely because three registrars in adja-
cent Macon County are placed under a court order. Under a pro-
gram of judicial enforcement of voting rights we must anticipate that
separate legal actions will be required in several hundred communi-
ties throughout the South. Proceedings on this piecemeal, case-by-
case, county-by-county basis can have only a minimal impact on the
problem of getting significant numbers of qualified Negroes regis-
tered to vote.
IV. A BETTER SOLUTION
If the present program of judicial enforcement cannot succeed
in securing the franchise to the great majority of Southern Negroes,
what alternative solutions may be presented? Numerous possibilities
were advocated before the past Congress.98 Although none of these
bills was wholly satisfactory,19 9 they did suggest two approaches to
194 Ibid. Judge Johnson disposes of all the objections in an opinion scarcely over
two pages in length.
195 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 17, 189 F. Supp. 121 (M.D.
Ga. 1960).
196 177 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. La. 1959), 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd, sub norm.
United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960).
'97 189 F. Supp. 121, 134-35 (M.D. Ga. 1960).
198 E.g., S. 3001, S. 2814, S. 2785, S. 2783, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. 2722,
S. 2719, S. 2684, S. 7535, S. 1084, S. 960, S. 957, S. 499, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).




the problem that would avoid the difficulties inherent in the litigation
of each incident of voting discrimination. Both of these approaches
would remove the vast discretionary powers now enjoyed by those
state officials who, as a class and according to a lengthy history,
demonstrate a regrettable enthusiasm for abusing such powers.
The first of these suggested approaches involves the replacement
of local registrars with impartial federal referees. These individuals
would be appointed by the President whenever he should believe it
ncessary to secure the franchise to all qualified citizens. These ref-
erees would assume all duties of the local registrar, including regis-
tration of qualified voters and supervision of all primary and general
elections involving congressional or presidential contests. A statute
of this nature obviously avoids the several obstacles inherent in judi-
cial enforcement. Its success would rest in the hands of the Chief
Executive. A hesitant approach or a reluctance to exercise the powers
vested in him would frustrate the effectiveness of this approach.
The major weakness of such a proposal lies in its restricted
scope. Under the provisions of article I, section 4 of the Constitution
the federal referees would be restricted to the realm of federal elec-
tions.20 Where state and federal elections are merged the states
would be obligated to adhere to the federal standards. The Southern
states would be free, however, to establish separate procedures for
state elections, and it is not unlikely that they would do so. At this
point article I, section 4 would have spent its force,201 and Congress
would be relegated to the provisions of the fifteenth amendment.
Congress could authorize the appointment of federal referees by the
President upon a determination by him that discriminatory practices
affecting the electoral process existed 20 Local elections could thus
be regulated, but in each instance the appointment would be subject
to challenge on "constitutional fact" questions.2 0 3 Thus it is difficult
to envision federal legislation that could effectively reach local elec-
tions without an ultimate judicial determination that discriminatory
conduct was engaged in by persons acting under color of law.
More uniform and democratic suffrage may be established
200 See text supra at notes 78-82.
201 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
202 Alternatively, this power might be delegated to an administrative body con-
stituted for that purpose.
203 The powers granted Congress by the fifteenth (like the fourteenth) amendment
are not plenary, but are restricted by the terms of § 1 of the amendment. United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Thus it is
necessary to determine 1) the existence of discriminatory conduct on account of race
or color, and 2) that such conduct was engaged in by persons acting under color of law.
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throughout the United States by a constitutional amendment2 14 to
read as follows:
Section 1. Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-
one years or older who has resided in any State or Territory six
months and in the voting precinct three months, immediately be-
fore offering to vote, shall be entitled to vote at any primary elec-
tion or other election therein, in which candidates for any public
office are nominated or elected, except that the privilege of voting
shall not extend to persons in confinement for crime nor to persons
adjudicated insane of mind.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by
appropriate legislation.2 0
5
Previous constitutional amendments have merely outlawed par-
ticular kinds of requirements, thus leaving the states free to establish
their qualifications upon the right to vote. As suggested previously,
most denials of the right to vote are today accomplished through dis-
criminatory application and administration of such state laws. 0 The
difficulties inherent in establishing to the satisfaction of a court the
existence of discrimination in a given case have been related. "It
appears to be impossible to enforce an impartial administration of
literacy tests now in force in some states, for, where there is a will
to discriminate, these tests provide the way.) 20 7
Every one of the qualifications contained in the proposed amend-
ment is drawn from the present law of one, all, or many states.08
By prohibiting complex voting requirements and providing clear,
simple and easily enforceable standards, it is submitted that this
would be the ultimate step toward free and universal suffrage.
John C. McDonald
204 Commission Report 144.
205 McGovney, op. cit. supra note 5, at 181.
206 Supra note 10.
207 Commission Report 143.
208 McGovney, op. cit. supra note 5, at 181.
